Canadian Bacon - History of Canadian Filmmaking (Part Seven)

“It can be very dangerous to see things from somebody else's point of view without the proper training.”
― Douglas Adams, Mostly Harmless

The 1970s

Part of the problem with the Canadian Audiovisual Industry was in Ottawa. The government didn’t understand the film; worse, it didn’t want to. The Canadian industry was fragmented, with each sector pulling in its own direction. The government was generally unwilling to study the problems of the Canadian film industry, which was affecting it globally. The other issue was that the Canadian film industry was so divided that it was difficult for the government to reach a conclusion or formulate a policy without incurring only minor criticism from all industry sectors, or to upset everyone.

In the 1970s, no Canadian drama was produced for television outside the CBC, and the CBC was the country's sole in-house producer. This in-house control over most Canadian productions significantly limited independent production studios' intake and profits. The CBC and NFB were double-edged swords. On one hand, they nurtured talent and offered steady gigs. On the other hand, they monopolized the creative pipeline. The NFB and the CBC did provide work opportunities and relatively high incomes, but only to a select few.

The golden era of experimental Canadian film was fading fast. The first generation of NFB and CBC filmmakers had retired or were approaching retirement age, and younger directors who could only find work in the private sector were needed.

For Canadian producers, “Canadian content” was a liability unless they were compensated for supporting Canadian themes through government financing or forced to meet Canadian content quotas through government regulation. This created an artificial production activity that could not be sustained indefinitely and made the industry subject to the fluctuations in government financing of its institutions, such as the CBC or Telefilm.

There was a firm conviction among filmmakers that if federal agencies commissioned more work from the private sector, the additional output would foster the growth of better production firms, enabling them to hire more permanent staff and achieve more significant sales, if the private sector found Canadian stories worth investing in.

The size and prosperity of the labor force were governed by federal legislation, policies, and funding, either directly or through the CBC and film agencies. Policies, taxation, and revenue practices affected investors, producers, and organized labor in ways that were not always beneficial to the film industry's strength. With talent and labor production costs running 50% lower than in the U.S., Canada was a bargain basement for American studios. Not to mention, independent production struggled under rigid union contracts, leaving little room for mid-budget experiments or low-cost passion projects.

In April 1975, disaster was looming. The 7,000-member Council of Canadian Filmmakers (CCFM) demanded action from the government because the CFDC had exhausted its funds after five years.

English-language feature production had flatlined. No major English-language feature film had been in production in Canada since August 1975, and English-language feature films declined from 13 in 1972 to 6 in 1973, 4 in 1974, and 0 in 1975. During the same four-year period, revenue earned in Canada by the seven major Hollywood distributors increased by 98.9% to $54.4 million. Canada, small as it was, had become Hollywood’s biggest foreign market. The estimated Canadian box office was $200 million annually, and none of those profits returned to the film crews and artists who made them possible.

During this time, there was widespread unemployment; about 80% of Canada’s best directors had left for Hollywood. Meanwhile, the Council, representing 8,000 industry workers, still had no voice on the CFDC Advisory Committee despite requests for one for over two years. The Canadian film industry was in survival mode. The industry was in freefall. The 1970s marked a downswing in the film industry, and it wouldn’t fully recover until the 1980s.

The Council of Canadian Filmmakers, a new lobbying group representing ACTRA, the Directors Guild, and the Toronto Filmmakers’ Co-op, which represents over 300 people, took their fight to the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration and were granted a hearing. These groups still regarded Famous Players and Odeon as a significant threat because they continued to block Canadian films from theatres and had a mandate from the government to purchase large-scale exhibitions, such as those run by Famous Players.

Famous Players openly blamed Canadians for not viewing their content at the time, stating, “Clearly, the people of Canada do not appreciate the works of most current Canadian filmmakers,” in several open letters to the press.

Their National Conference in March ‘75 brought all the stakeholders to the table: NFB, CFDC, CBC, provincial representatives, technical crews, distributors, and even the Secretary of State to solve the Canadian film industry's many problems. Among the topics were the kind of film industry Canada wanted, philosophy and policy, markets and funding, and Federal Government policies. Many pointed fingers at the CFDC, accusing it of inaction. At the same time, Canadian films were overshadowed by American imports, even though they had little distribution reach to make a difference.

In the summer of '75, Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner commissioned an independent probe into the guts of the Canadian film industry. A cold, bureaucratic eye was needed. This study, which ran from July 1975 to March 1976, became known as the 'Tompkins Report' because Tompkins was the project manager for the Bureau of Management Consulting.

Faulkner took a hard look at the NFB, the CFDC, and the CBC. This study aimed to identify and analyze the composition of the labor force working in the film production industry. The CFDC had been cozying up to international co-productions since ’73, but nobody could show that it affected the domestic market, whether good or bad, who got paid, or where the jobs landed.

The conclusion of the report’s findings ended up echoing the same song on a broken record. Its findings were that, even though the costs of producing feature films and television were 50% lower than in the United States, film producers were wary of establishing permanent bases in Canada. Private television networks and stations accounted for only a small share of the work available to creative talent, and the CBC remained the largest employer of Canadian creative talent. Most workers were still contractors rather than part-time or permanent employees, shifting from job to job without a safety net.

The CFDC was also criticized for failing to actively promote the distribution of Canadian feature films in Canada and abroad, even though the organization had no control over how to get its films into mainstream theatres. But overall, the 'Tompkins Report' focused on the lack of stable employment in the industry, and the hope was that continued Rapid technological change would increase the number of jobs for technicians in filmmaking. This happy-go-lucky assumption that the benefits of new technology would become a saving grace for artists was a sad omen for the future.

The report concluded as most Canadian film studies do: with a plea. If Canada wanted to preserve its culture, it needed to establish a distribution system that would enable its films to reach broader audiences in Canada and abroad. The foundation for a professional industry was in place; another developmental phase was needed to provide more stable employment for the labor force and opportunities for creative talent.

After processing the car-crashing results of the study, Faulkner made a deal, albeit a very minimal one. Famous Players and Odeon Theatres—the two giants that ruled Canadian screens—agreed, “voluntarily,” to carry Canadian films for four weeks per year, per theatre, and invest a minimum of $1.7 million in their productions. The hope was that this would provide greater opportunities for Canadian films to be screened in Canadian theatres and expand their audiences. It was a tiny band-aid on a massive, open wound. The new rules went live in August 1975. The agreements required each theatre chain to run one Canadian film for one week each quarter. The chains were to keep records and submit them to the CFDC quarterly.

Faulkner then undertook two other significant initiatives to attract private capital into the industry. One was a tax shelter—investors could write off 100% of their film investments annually. In February 1976, the Secretary of State also expanded the CFDC's reach and responsibilities by authorizing it to oversee existing co-production agreements with France, Italy, the UK, and Canada.

Parts of the private sector also promised to chip in another $3 million, matching the CFDC’s annual investment in Canadian film initiatives. However, the CFDC remained constrained by limited funding and restricted eligibility for its films to be distributed. By 1977, even the Treasury Board was asking hard questions and re-evaluating the CFDC's mandate because of these limitations, which threatened to compromise the CFDC altogether.

By 1977, things were grim. Canada had become a dumping ground for American B-pictures. Morale plummeted. Canadian filmmakers became concerned that the industry would not, in the long run, become profitable for local artists and filmmakers.

That summer in Winnipeg, Leonard S. Evans, Minister of Industry and Commerce for Manitoba, stepped up to the mic at the Society of Cineamateurs. He didn’t mince words."Unless Canadian filmmakers have access to the medium that shows their films, we might as well stop fooling ourselves into thinking we will produce feature films in this country." He liked that the film industry's problem was that Canada was a mine mainly used for “raw materials.” This was true. America would bring its scripts and action, use Canadian cities as backdrops for blockbusters, and leave. Canadians' skills and creativity were exploited, and most of their energy was spent pursuing subsequent contract work.

Welcome Back Telefilm

By 1978, the Canadian Film Development Corporation was under new management and started to lean into what the American market was forming canada into. In a move that was simply: If you can’t beat them, join them. Michael McCabe assumed leadership at the CFDC and began encouraging the use of foreign stars and foreign-producer-initiated projects. He relied heavily on the Capital Cost Allowance and on the skills and connections he developed through his work in broadcasting, thereby increasing total Canadian investment in feature films from $19 million in 1977 to $165 million in 1980. This investment in the CFDC was encouraging but ultimately unsuccessful, as many films remained unreleased and Canadian voices were drowned out by international co-productions that met only the bare minimum to qualify. Indigenous production stalled, and only a few breakthrough productions were created with the help of the CFDC.

In 1980, André Lamy stepped in, a cleanup man with a mission to fix the mess McCabe left behind. Three years later, the Canadian Broadcast Program Development Fund was born, allocating $245 million over 5 years to films mainly co-financed by television networks, the private sector, and the CFDC. This arrangement guaranteed the films a broadcast window, thereby avoiding distribution problems and stimulating the production of high-quality, culturally relevant Canadian television programs, thereby reaching the broadest possible audience during prime-time viewing hours. Following this, the CFDC was reborn in 1984 as Telefilm Canada, reflecting its expanding investment in television production. Following André Lamy's tenure, Peter Pearson was executive director of Telefilm from 1985 to 87.

Telefilm had successfully encouraged production growth in various cities across the country, including Toronto. Telefilm’s new feature film fund helped launch Glen-Warren Productions’ 14,000-square-foot studio in Scarborough, which opened in November 1987. Strictly for film production, and not for videotape, the studio would become one of the most significant production buildings in Canada.

Telefilm's injection of cash into the economy pushed Toronto into a hub of ambition. By 1984, 121 firms, mostly small companies, employed about 1,616 people in the city. Feature, documentary, and commercial film companies, television production, editing, film processing, videotape, animation, equipment rental, and distribution firms were starting to blossom across the city, most located in the King Street and Spadina Ave. area. In 1985, the city hosted more than 102 separate shoots.

In 1988, the Broadcast Fund was granted permanent status with an annual budget of $60 million, which stimulated the development of the independent production industry more than any other support system had in decades. Pierre Des Roches assumed leadership of Telefilm that same year (1988-94), and Telefilm was placed on a more businesslike footing, shifting its role in film and television projects to that of an investor rather than a subsidizer. Distribution contracts had to be in place before financing was approved, and the recoupment of loaned funds was prioritized. Telefilm was now the leading investor in film production nationwide, forging partnerships with various provincial film agencies.

The creation of Telefilm's Broadcast Fund for the independent production/distribution sector in the mid-1980s led to a more sustained and viable independent production sector in Ontario and other provinces, and funds allowed the production of an increasing number of small-budget feature films.

As of today, Telefilm now invests in the distribution, marketing, and subtitling of films produced with its support, including new media and music. It also administers a grant program for Canadian film festivals and supervises coproduction agreements with more than 20 countries.

The 1980s

In the 1980s, Canada's film industry faced significant challenges, even with the assistance of Telefilm, including the dominance of American productions and a proliferation of low-budget films produced under the tax shelter system. In response, Quebec and Ontario implemented strategic measures to foster and protect their local film industries.

Under the leadership of Premier René Lévesque, a Symbol of the Quiet Revolution and founder of the Parti Québécois (among his many titles), the Quebec Cinema Act was passed in 1983. The Quebec Cinema Act required distributors to be located in Quebec, invest at least 10% of their revenue in Quebec's film industry, and be at least 80% Canadian-owned to distribute their films. These measures led to significant tensions with the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), prompting the MPAA to boycott the Quebec film market. Canadian distributors not based in Quebec were now excluded from the province's distribution market because they refused to invest in Quebec's film market and because of the MPAA's successful lobbying. America’s attitude was that if they weren’t allowed to make money in Quebec, other Canadian filmmakers and distributors weren’t allowed to either. Although these measures protected Quebec, they limited other Canadian distributors without a base in Quebec. But this system protected Quebec, and because of it, it became the only self-sustaining film market in North America.

The downside was that French films now had no place in the MPAA’s English-speaking echo chamber. The requirements of MPAA-approved films effectively excluded all demographic groups other than white audiences. Filmmakers and production companies were cautious about catering to Quebec’s French audience and strayed away from them for years. These policies also affected other foreign distributors, who were encouraged to refrain from submitting their films to countries with French- and English-speaking audiences.

By 1981, English Canadian filmmakers still lacked sufficient options to produce Hollywood-style films. Filmmakers were forced to persuade major Hollywood studios to "pick up" films for distribution. Regardless of whether the film is picked up, the costs of prints, advertising and promotion, transportation, executive travel, entertainment overhead, and other expenses would increase the overall cost. Canadian producers would still lose money on a picture that succeeded at the box office and made money for the distributor.

Hollywood producers, not Canadian producers, largely controlled films produced in Canada, and these productions were generally weak in terms of script quality and final output. They were filled with Canadian actors who cost less than Hollywood stars and qualified for the tax break. The mainstream of Canadian feature film production began to imitate Hollywood films, in which Canadian locations were disguised as American and Hollywood locations. These "Canadian" films were also rarely acquired by major Hollywood studios for distribution because of their perceived inferiority to Hollywood productions.

Some of the B movies that emerged from this tax-shelter era were erotic thrillers, such as Bedroom Eyes (1984); comedy science fiction films, such as Big Meat Eater (1982); and mockumentaries, such as The Mysterious Moon Men of Canada(1988). They were quirky, forgettable, and cheap.

Another effort to encourage more French and co-English co-productions was the 1983 Canada-France Film Co-Production Agreement. The agreement facilitated sharing resources, funding, and creative expertise, enabling filmmakers from both nations to collaborate on innovative projects. Initially focused on feature films, the agreement would grow to encompass a broader range of projects, including documentaries, animated films, and television series.

In Quebec, many celebrated filmmakers emerged in the late 80s and early 90s, including André Turpin, Micheline Lanctôt, Robert Morin, and Robert Lepage. Arguably, they had a better filmography than their English counterparts of the time. In 1985, an analysis of Telefilm Canada indicated success in allocating funds to bolster French-language production, which fostered many small-budget projects and led to the rise of more notable directors and creators of Canadian content.

By the 1980s, computers and software were also reshaping film production and the working world. Estimates warned that automation, technological change, and the long-range implications of computers and their software raised significant contentious issues. Overall, it was estimated that 100,000 jobs would be lost yearly to technological change over the next decade.

Communications technology significantly changed the distribution system. Satellite-to-cable transmission lay at the heart of Canadian broadcast systems and paved the way for pay TV. When satellite dish restrictions were lifted, direct-to-dish broadcasting expanded rapidly. Canada's 1985 communications and film distribution system was technically and radically different from that of any other country. It could transmit and receive data, images, and sound in both traditional analog and digital formats. Many could not do so in such a wide-ranging manner.

These advances transformed the production process. Digital editing workstations altered the roles of editors and directors. The rise of HDTV introduced new complexities, necessitating investment in new equipment and a steep learning curve. HDTV influenced Producers to invest in HDTV production facilities and learn how to exploit the technology.

The industry's survival strategy began to focus on cross-promotion between the film and video sectors. With support from both sides of the industry, it was seen as the best way to sustain income for many creative sectors and to maintain stability in some of Canada’s broader creative industries.

These developments were central to a growing disconnect between production and distribution systems. The pressure to move to digitally based forms of production was increasing. At the same time, new distribution systems centered on television massively expanded the number of TV channels available to viewers. The traditional production system faced greatly increased competition from foreign sources, and demand for more programming rose rapidly. And all of these channels had to be filled up somehow.

Technical alteration and expansion of the distribution system were not the result of 'natural evolution' or an internal dynamic of technology itself. The new distribution system was actively promoted and implemented by the federal government. The Conservative government was cutting traditional funding sources for production ($75 million from the CBC) and promoting a market-oriented economic model that tilted the balance toward private-sector control.

Technological advancements flooded every corner of the industry. In sound production, digitalized (analog systems with digital controls), completely digital recorders, processors, signal generators, microphones, and mixing boards with memory were gaining popularity. There were also cameras (video and film) in image production, with high-resolution lenses, high-speed film emulsions, low-power daylight lighting systems, computer-controlled camera movement and stabilization systems, and memory, graphics, and animation systems.

In post-production, a range of computerized editing techniques was employed. Storage and filing systems for sound and picture, based on videotape and computer disc transport mechanisms, all of which had attached memory. There was a broad range of miniprocessor-based word-processing systems for production coordination, budget modeling, and graphics generation in office environments. The computer keyboard could now control all production equipment.

New technology threatened job security and the maintenance of skills in program production, and technological defensiveness did as well. Unions, unsure how to respond, often resisted rather than negotiated approaches to new technology and its introduction. In an environment of technological change, whether desirable or not, organizational aspects of production had to be reconsidered, from the composition of the production unit and the structure of the production process to the role of unions and the structure of production organizations.

Tightening seniority clauses for negotiating technological change based on new technology, and tightening seniority, layoff, retraining, and jurisdictional clauses, did not protect jobs. The future demanded a new playbook. Organized labor had to become a proactive force, not just a protective one. Technological change is needed to embrace a more modernized production system, to shape working conditions, preserve job security, and develop innovative, cost-effective programming.

On top of rising technological changes, American producers showed little interest in opening permanent production facilities or operations bases in Canada during the late 1980s, seeing their stay in Canada as temporary. The lack of vision for the long-term viability of American investment in Canadian producers was disheartening for many. It led many Canadian producers to shift their interests to programs that were commercially viable in the United States.

Ontario Film Development Corporation(OFDC )